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Introduction
When asset markets are incomplete, competitive equilibrium allocations generically fail to satisfy the criterion of constrained Pareto optimality which recognizes the incompleteness of the asset market. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) showed that, generically, there exist reallocations of portfolios that yield Pareto improvements in welfare after prices in spot commodity markets adjust to attain equilibrium; Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) developed further and generalized the argument.
The failure of constrained optimality casts doubt on non-intervention with competitive markets.
Expansions of the asset market do not necessarily lead to Pareto improvements: Hart (1975) gave an example of financial innovation that leads to a Pareto deterioration; Cass and Citanna (1998) , Elul (1995) and Hara (1997) identified conditions for Pareto improving financial innovation.
The taxation of trades in assets, which is anonymous, can generically implement a Pareto improvement. Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001) demonstrated the result, which requires that the number of individuals not exceed the number of traded assets; it provides only a partial answer to Kajii (1994) , who pointed out that, apart from informational requirements, the heterogeneity of individuals and the requirement of anonymity may interfere with improving interventions.
The direct regulation of prices in spot commodity markets is an alternative to the reallocation of portfolios or the taxation of trades in assets. Importantly, this is not an intervention in individual choice variables but in market variables, and, as such, it satisfies the requirement of anonymity.
An extension of the fix-price equilibrium of Drèze (1975) provides a notion of equilibrium that allows for trading at non-competitive prices; alternative specifications, in Barro and Grossman (1971) , Bénassy (1975) or Younès (1975) should not affect the argument.
The results of Laroque (1978, 1981) , nevertheless, point out a stumbling block: the behavior of fix-price equilibria in the neighborhood of competitive equilibria is particularly complicated. There are robust examples for which, at regulated prices close to competitive prices, there are no fix-price equilibria close to competitive equilibria. Here, we restrict attention to the class of economies, evidently restrictive, that satisfy conditions sufficient for the local uniqueness of fix-price equilibria. In Herings and Polemarchakis (2003), a robust example illustrates the approach as well as the results.
The conditions under which the result holds, that the number of instruments (contingent commodities) exceed the number of objectives (individuals), imply that the result complements the one of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001) .
Antecedents of this result are the argument in Polemarchakis (1979) , where fixed wages that need not match shocks in productivity may yield higher expected utility in spite of the loss of output in an economy of overlapping generations; and the argument in Drèze and Gollier (1993) , which employs the capital 1 asset pricing model to determine optimal schedules of wages that differ from the marginal productivity of labor. Kalmus (1997) gave a heuristic example of Pareto improving price regulation.
Of serious concern are the informational requirements needed to determine, even compute, improving interventions. In the case of price regulation they involve knowledge of marginal utilities of income and excess demands for commodities across states. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) and Kübler, Chiappori, Ekeland and Polemarchakis (2002) are only first steps towards an analysis of the informational requirements of active policy.
The economy
The economy is that of the standard two-period general equilibrium model with numéraire assets and incomplete asset markets. Assets exchange before and commodities after the state of the world realizes.
States of the world are s ∈ S = {1, . 
.).
The asset payoff matrix has full column rank, and the numéraire asset has positive payoffs: R A+1· > 0.
Individuals are i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}. A utility function, u i , that satisfies standard conditions of continuity, monotonicity, quasi-concavity and, when required, smoothness and boundary behavior, and the endowment, e i , a strictly positive bundle, describe an individual -the boundary behavior of the utility function, together with the strict positivity of the endowment guarantee that consumption bundles demanded by the individual lie in the interior of the consumption set, as in see Debreu (1972) .
The utility functions and consumption sets of individuals as well as the matrix of asset payoffs do not vary. The allocation of endowments, ω = (. . . , e i , . . .), identifies an economy, and the set of economies coincides with the strictly positive orthant of the commodity space; a property holds generically if it holds for an open set of economies of full Lebesgue measure.
Prices of commodities at a state of the world are (. . . , p l,s , . . . , 1); across states of the world, p = (. . . , p s , . . .) 0; the price of the numéraire commodity at a state of the world is p L+1,s = 1; the domain of prices of commodities is P. Prices of assets are q = (. . . , q a , . . . , 1); The price of the numéraire asset is q A+1 = 1. The domain of prices of assets is Q.
It is often convenient to truncate prices of commodities and prices of assets by deleting the prices of the numéraires. Commodities or assets other than the numéraire areĽ orǍ; the domain of prices of commodities or assets other than the numéraires isP orQ.
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium, typically, does not exist. In commodities and assets other than the numéraire, rationing on net trades, uniform across individuals, serves to attain market clearing. Rationing in the supply (demand) of commodities other than the numéraire is z ≤ 0 (z ≥ 0). Rationing in the supply (demand) of assets other than the numéraire is y ≤ 0 (y ≥ 0). Without appropriate rationing constraints, demand and supply of commodities will not match, which leads to inconsistencies. Equilibrium rationing constraints are exactly such that markets clear.
At prices and rationing (p, q, z, z, y, y), the budget set of an individual is
his optimization problem is to choose a utility maximizing consumption bundle and asset portfolio in his budget set. The set of all optimal consumption bundles and asset portfolios is denoted d i (p, q, z, z, y, y). An individual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for a commodity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing constraint in the supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is effective supply (demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one individual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset. At a competitive equilibrium, there is neither effective supply rationing nor effective demand rationing in the market for any commodity or asset. In this sense, a competitive equilibrium is a special case of a fix-price equilibrium. 
Definition 1 (Fix-price equilibrium). A fix-price equilibrium at prices
If a competitive equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium allocation, then, for prices close to competitive equilibrium prices, there is exactly one fix-price equilibrium allocation close to the competitive allocation.
For a locally unique competitive equilibrium allocation, for each sign vector r, the function (
Comparative statics require a differentiable form of local uniqueness. Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) proved, for a complete asset market, that, generically, the set of fix-price equilibrium allocations can be represented by a finite number of continuously differentiable functions of prices. Nevertheless, the results in Laroque (1978) and the examples in Madden (1982) show that competitive equilibria need not be locally unique as fix-price equilibria. Even though fix-price equilibrium allocations exist for all prices, there may be robust local non-existence, and therefore local non-uniqueness as a fix-price equilibrium, at competitive prices.
Definition 2 (Differentiable local uniqueness

Assumption 1. For endowments in Ω
* , an open set of full Lebesgue measure, if
competitive equilibrium, then the competitive equilibrium allocation is differentiably locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium allocation.
By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981), Appendix 2 characterizes economies where competitive equilibrium allocation are differentiably locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium allocation.
Local uniqueness of fix-price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria is not too strong a requirement; it is less demanding than the requirement of uniqueness of fix-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of competitive prices. This guarantees a certain degree of generality of the results.
The function ( x, y) associates the unique fix-price equilibrium allocation in N x * ,y * to (p, q) ∈ N p * ,q * . At a locally unique fix-price equilibrium,
defines the indirect utility function of an individual. Lemma 2 in Appendix 2 implies that it is differentiable when the fix-price equilibrium is differentiably locally unique, with partial derivatives given by
The effect of a change in the spot market price of commodity (l, s) ∈Ľ × S is equal to minus the marginal utility of the numéraire commodity in state s multiplied by the excess demand of commodity (l, s) at the competitive equilibrium. Lemma 2 in Appendix 2 therefore implies that the indirect welfare effects of a change in prices, generated by the induced change in the rationing constraints and individuals' choices, equal zero.
Pareto improving price regulation
If the asset market is incomplete, A+1 < S, generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are not Pareto optimal.
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p * , q * ), (x * , y * )) if there exist prices of commodities p such that a fix-price equilibrium of commodities at prices of commodities and assets (p, q * ) Pareto dominates the allocation x * . The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple fix-price equilibrium allocations at prices (p, q * ) is circumvented by considering local variations at competitive equilibrium allocations that are differentiably locally unique as fix-price equilibria.
Definition 3 (Pareto improving price regulation). Price regulation can Pareto improve upon a competitive equilibrium, ((p
, that is locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium if there exists dp ∈ IR LS such that
Uniform price regulation can improve upon a competitive equilibrium if dp s = dp s , for all s, s ∈ S.
If (uniform) price regulation can improve upon a competitive equilibrium, there is ε > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε], the fix-price equilibrium in the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium ((p * , q * ), (x * , y * )) at commodity priceš p * + εdp and asset prices q * Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium. Uniform price regulations are of interest because they imply a state-independent change in prices. It shows that relatively simple policies suffice for the realization of a Pareto improvement 1 . Generically, it is possible to make every individual better off by choosing appropriate price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are incomplete. One needs at least as many instruments, LS, as individuals, I.
Uniform price regulation is effective when L ≥ I, which reflects again that the number of instruments has to exceed the number of objectives. This complements the constrained suboptimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), which applies when 2L ≤ I ≤ L(S − 1) + 1. 
The matrix of payoffs of assets has full column rank. The numeraire asset, has positive payoff:
r A+1 > 0.
If Assumption 1 holds, the asset market is incomplete (A+1 < S), and LS ≥ I > 1, then, generically, price regulation can improve upon any competitive equilibrium.
If L ≥ I > 1, then, generically, uniform price regulation can improve upon any competitive equilibrium.
Appendix 3 gives the proof, which follows Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998).
In the paper we focus on the adjustment of prices of state-contingent commodities, rather than asset prices. One reason for this is that government interventions in commodity prices seem to occur much more frequently than government control of asset prices. From a purely normative point of view, the case where the central planner is limited to adjustments of asset prices only, with competitive spot commodity markets in future periods, is interesting as well. It provides an anonymous alternative to the adjustment of individual asset portfolios as proposed in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) .
A final issue of interest is the case where asset prices adjust to clear markets after the central planner intervened in spot commodity markets. The current analysis fixes asset prices at q * , which allows us to derive a simple expression for the derivative with respect to spot commodity prices of the indirect utility function in Lemma 2. The corresponding expression for an indirect utility function where asset prices adjust to clear the asset markets is more complicated, and the question whether Pareto improving price regulation is possible in that sense is open. 
Appendix 1: existence of fix-price equilibria
A compact, convex subset of the consumption set that contains the aggregate initial endowment in its interior is X i The assumptions on utility functions and on the asset return matrix imply that all S + 1 budget inequalities in the definition of the budget set hold with equality at the optimal choice of an individual. The rationing inequalities do not necessarily hold with equality. The budget set related to X i with all budget inequalities required to hold with equality is β i and the corresponding demand function d i . Since prices are fixed at (p, q), they are omitted in the notation.
The demand functions d i , i ∈ I, are continuous. If (z n , z n , y n , y n ) is a sequence that converges to (z, z, y, y), then the sequence ( d i (z n , z n , y n , y n )) has a convergent subsequence, with limit ( x, y) ∈
A − , and A + , is the sets of non-numéraire commodities and non-numéraire assets for which x l,s −e i l,s is negative, positive, y a is negative, and positive, respectively, then, for
lim n→∞ λ n = 1, and lim n→∞ ( x n , y n ) = ( x, y). By the continuity of u i , x n is strictly preferred to the consumption bundle in d i (z n , z n , y n , y n ), a contradiction.
Since there is no rationing in the market of the numéraire asset nor in the market of the numéraire commodities, the argument for equilibrium existence is not trivial.
If ((x * , y * ), (z * , z * , y * , y * )) is a fix-price equilibrium at prices (p, q), then
l,s + ε, with ε some fixed positive number. Since R has full column rank, this implies that there is α > 0 such that y * i ∞ < α for any y * i consistent with a fix-price equilibrium at prices (p, q). The functions (z, z) :
The excess demand function z :
, is a fix-price equilibrium. Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 1 are satisfied for non-numeraire commodities and assets. The construction of the functions (z, z) and (y, y) takes care of Conditions 3 and 4.
The set z(C LS × C A ) is compact. Let the set ZY be a compact, convex set that contains z( 
Appendix 2: local comparative statics
In the optimization problem an individual faces when determining his demand, the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints in the markets for commodities (assets) are π (ρ). The individual optimization problem leads to the study of a modified demand function, d i .
At prices and Lagrange multipliers (p, q, π, ρ), d
i is defined by the solution to the optimization problem
The set of (p, q, π, ρ) on which each individual optimization problem has a solution is N . Whenever (p * , q * ) are competitive equilibrium prices, N is a neighborhood of (p * , q * , 0, 0). For a generic set of economies, there is exactly one individual in each market with the minimal excess demand and exactly one individual with the maximal excess demand. For the remainder, the allocation of endowments in the economy E belong to the set Ω, which permits the study of the local structure of the set fix-price equilibria in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium The function c associates with Lagrange multipliers, (π, ρ), fix-price equilibria in the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium. The aggregate modified excess demand function for commodities and assets other than the numéraire is z : N → IR LS+A defined by
For the study of fix-price equilibria in the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium, it is sufficient to restrict attention to the zero points of z. 
The function z is differentiable on N r . The limit of its Jacobian,
where z(p, q) denotes the unconstrained total excess demand function for commodities and assets other than the numeraires at prices (p, q). It follows that the Jacobian with respect to (p,q) is independent of r at a competitive equilibrium. Proposition 2 in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) shows that the assumption that ∂z(p * , q * ) has full rank at every competitive equilibrium holds generically in endowments. Lemma 3.2 characterizes the tangent cones to the regions in the price space having a fix-price equilibrium with state of the markets r in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium. It guarantees neither that the closures of these tangent cones cover the price space nor that the tangent cones are full-dimensional nor that the tangent cones do not intersect. If this were the case, local uniqueness would result.
Proof
In general, an increase in a price causes a different individual to be rationed as a decrease in a price. Since ∂ π,ρ z r , and therefore the tangent cone, depend on ∂ π,ρ d i for the individual i that is rationed, the fact that the tangent cones need not fit nicely together does not come as a surprise. In abstract terms, the fact that different individuals get rationed at different prices in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium, creates non-differentiabilities in the function z at competitive prices. At a point of non-differentiability, the implicit function theorem need not apply, and local uniqueness may fail.
The generalized Jacobian of a Lipschitz continuous function f at a point x is the convex hull of all matrices that are the limits of the sequence (∂f (x n )), where (x n ) is a convergent sequence with lim n→∞ x n = x and f is differentiable at x n . A restriction of the fundamentals of the economy, the utility functions of individuals and the matrix of asset payoffs is required to guarantee that, generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are differentiably locally unique as fix-price equilibrium allocations If a function f is Lipschitz continuous, f ( x, y) = 0, and every matrix M in ∂ x f ( x, y) has full rank, then there exist a neighborhood N x, y , a neighborhood N y , and a Lipschitz continuous function g on N y such that (x, y) ∈ N x, y and f (x, y) = 0 if and only if y ∈ N y and x = g(y). By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981), the competitive equilibrium allocation is differentiably locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium allocation.
Assumption 2. For endowments in
Remark An example of an economy that satisfies differentiable local uniqueness for all endowments and,à fortiori, satisfies Assumption 2.
There are three states of the world, two commodities and two assets. The utility functions have an additively separable representation
and a uniform probability measure π over the states of the world. The payoffs of the assets are R ·1 = (1, 0, 0) , and R ·2 = (0, 1, 0 
) . The resulting matrix is given by
and its determinant equals
The determinant of ∂ π,ρ z r is positive, irrespective of the sign vector r. It follows that the competitive equilibrium allocation is differentiably locally unique as a fix-price equilibrium allocation. Local uniqueness of fix-price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria is not too strong a requirement. It is less demanding than the requirement of uniqueness of fix-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of competitive prices. The latter requirement guarantees a certain degree of generality of our results.
The function ( x, y) : N p * ,q * → IR I(L+1)S+I(A+1) associates the unique fixprice equilibrium allocation in N x * ,y * to (p, q) ∈ N p * ,q * . The indirect utility function of an individual at a locally unique fix-price equilibrium is defined by 
Proof For every sign vector r, the restriction of with respect to p l,s , and the first order conditions for individual optimization at a competitive equilibrium,
it follows that
Since the derivative is independent of the sign vector r, the result follows. 2
Appendix 3: Pareto improving price regulation
Pareto improvement by price regulation is possible only if the asset market is incomplete. Another necessary requirement is that the economy allows for heterogeneous individuals. The function ϕ is defined by
where the Lagrangian multiplier λ i ∈ IR does not vary with the state of the world, the prices of commodities p ∈ IR (L+1)S−1 ++ ×{1} are discounted prices, with only the price of commodity (L+1, S) normalized to 1, and n = 0 is a fixed vector such that nR = 0. In the standard reformulation of the incomplete markets model in discounted prices, it is assumed that one individual is unconstrained, so that his marginal utility at an optimal choice is proportional to the price system. Pareto optimality implies that the marginal utility vectors of all agents should be proportional to the price system. The function ϕ is completed by specifying budget constraints and market clearing conditions, and one condition for every individual but one that recognizes the incompleteness of markets:
The existence of n = 0 such that nR = 0 follows from market incompleteness. It follows that the function ϕ vanishes at a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium.
For a function f that depends on a vector of variables α and on endowments e, f e (α) is the function that results from fixing e; for instance, ϕ e (x, λ, p) = ϕ(x, λ, p, e).
Lemma 3. Generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are not Pareto optimal.
Proof A necessary condition for x to be a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for an economy e is that ϕ e (x, λ, p) = 0. Since the dimension of the domain of ϕ e is lower than the dimension of the range, whenever ϕ e is transverse to 0, a solution to ϕ e (x, λ, p) = 0 does not exist. By a standard argument, ϕ is transverse to 0. By the transversal density theorem, the set of economies for which ϕ e is transverse to 0 has full Lebesgue measure. By a standard argument, this set can be chosen to be open. If ψ is transverse to 0, then it follows from the transversal density theorem that for a subset of endowments of full Lebesgue measure, ψ e is transverse to 0. If LS ≥ I, then the dimension of the range of ψ e exceeds that of the domain. Transversality of ψ e implies that there are no solutions to the associated system of equations. It is possible to Pareto improve all competitive equilibria by price regulation. It is possible to represent a utility function satisfying A2 by one with ∂ 2 u i (x i ) negative definite on a bounded subset of the consumption set. Then it follows that v 1,i,·,· = 0. For i ∈ I, 0 = v ∂ y i
